Chapter 260


ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Application to committee collecting contributions to establish fund to defray elected official’s expenses incurred in performing political functions of office, (1980) Vol 40, p 11; preemption by federal law of campaign financing with respect to federal candidates, (1981) Vol 41, p 420


LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 50 OLR 299-321 (1971); 55 OLR 253-266 (1976)


      260.005 to 260.255




      Disclosure requirements, specifically with respect to third parties, do not infringe on right to associate for political purposes and are constitutional. Oregon Socialist Workers v. Paulus, 432 F Supp 1255 (1977)




      See also annotations under ORS 260.305 in permanent edition.




      For purposes of defining contribution, “any other thing of value” means any item that has fair market value, regardless of whether contributor used item for purposes related to that fair market value. Jim Bernard for Clackamas County Commissioner v. Elections Division, 229 Or App 419, 211 P3d 321 (2009)


      For purposes of defining contribution, to furnish means to give something needed or desirable. Jim Bernard for Clackamas County Commissioner v. Elections Division, 229 Or App 419, 211 P3d 321 (2009)


ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Compensation for political activity, (1974) Vol 36, p 903; expenditures by independent nonpartisan group, (1974) Vol 36, p 915; political contributions as credit against Oregon tax return, (1974) Vol 37, p 159






      Person must file report of expenditures for publication in support of or opposition to candidate if: 1) message, in context, clearly and unambiguously urges election or defeat of candidate; 2) message, as whole, seeks action as opposed to giving information; and 3) action advocated by message is clear. State ex rel Crumpton v. Keisling, 160 Or App 406, 982 P2d 3 (1999), Sup Ct review denied




      See annotations under ORS 260.162 in permanent edition.




      See also annotations under ORS 254.600 in permanent edition.




Under former similar statute


      Where local petition signatures were submitted for verification in batches, filing of statement by deadline for submitting signatures was sufficient. Jewett v. Yerkovich, 27 Or App 127, 555 P2d 950 (1976)


In general


      Secretary of State did not err in assessing civil penalty under this section for failure to timely file contributions and expenditure statement for initiative campaign that failed to meet local ordinance deadline. Salem Committee v. Secretary of State, 109 Or App 364, 819 P2d 752 (1991)










      Three-month period in this section for beginning examination of contribution and expenditure reports does not limit power of Secretary of State to investigate contribution and expenditure report violations under ORS 260.345. Gold v. Secretary of State, 106 Or App 573, 809 P2d 1334 (1991)






      Discretion to impose fine for filing violations is not limited to cases of willful or intentional violation. United Telephone Employees PAC v. Secretary of State, 138 Or App 135, 906 P2d 306 (1995)






      Although ORS 260.200 et seq. deal specifically with contribution and expenditure reporting requirements, ORS 260.345 also covers violations of those requirements. Gold v. Secretary of State, 106 Or App 573, 809 P2d 1334 (1991)










      Person was not qualified to be candidate for office of State Treasurer in general election because, if elected, she could not qualify at the beginning of her term as result of disability imposed upon her under this section. McAlmond v. Myers, 262 Or 521, 500 P2d 457 (1972)






      Prohibition in 2003 version of this section against falsely identifying political contributor did not violate constitutional free speech rights and was not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Moyer, 225 Or App 81, 200 P3d 619 (2009), aff’d 348 Or 220, 230 P3d 7 (2010)






      City charter and ordinance provisions which subjected municipal political activities of city employes during nonworking hours to virtually complete restrictions were preempted by this section, which is general law establishing permissible degree of regulation of public employe’s political freedom. Williams v. City of Astoria, 43 Or App 745, 604 P2d 411 (1979), Sup Ct review denied


      Prohibition against requiring public employee to support political cause does not supersede right of exclusive representative of employees to collect payment-in-lieu-of-dues to support political position affecting rights of represented employees. Carlson v. AFSCME, 73 Or App 755, 700 P2d 260 (1985), Sup Ct review denied


ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Application of federal Hatch Political Activities Act to employes who run for partisan elective office, (1978) Vol 38, p 1826; because ORS 352.105 does not require that programs funded with mandatory incidental fees be under supervision or control of boards that collect them, this section does not prohibit State Board of Higher Education from providing mandatory incidental fees to student organization that would use incidental fees to advocate for or against ballot measure, (2015) No. 8289






      Statements are not false as that word is used in the Corrupt Practices Act if any reasonable inference that can be drawn from the statement is either a correct inference of fact or a matter of opinion. Eustace v. Speckhart, 14 Or App 485, 514 P2d 25 (1973)


      Ambiguous statement that allows erroneous inference to be drawn is not violation of Corrupt Practices Act. Committee to Retain Judge Tanzer v. Lee, 270 Or 215, 527 P2d 247 (1974)


      If reasonable inference of opinion or correct fact can be drawn, statement is not false even though erroneous inference could also be drawn from it. Sumner v. Bennett, 45 Or App 275, 608 P2d 566 (1980)


      Challenges to primary elections brought under this section must be dismissed unless trial and appellate courts have rendered final determination at least 30 days prior to general election. Koch v. Makinson, 52 Or App 155, 628 P2d 397 (1981)


      Since this section provides unitary remedy, where no judgment was rendered depriving defendant of nomination, no severable cause of action for damages existed. Koch v. Makinson, 52 Or App 155, 628 P2d 397 (1981)


      Under this section, even assuming false statement of material fact did not supply ground to set aside election. Stork v. Columbia River PUD, 58 Or App 51, 646 P2d 1372 (1982), Sup Ct review denied


      Where political committee’s purpose is essentially identical to candidate’s purpose, committee is aggrieved party under this section and may bring action for false statement about candidate. Committee of 1000 v. Eivers, 296 Or 195, 674 P2d 1159 (1983)


      Statements are not “false” within meaning of this section if any reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence that statement is factually correct or that statement is merely an expression of opinion; statement that state senator “introduced legislation to add a new statewide property tax” is true in one sense and false in another where senator sponsored resolution that would have been initial step in establishing statewide property tax had certain sequence of events occurred. Committee of 1000 v. Eivers, 296 Or 195, 674 P2d 1159 (1983)


      Trial court did not err when it imposed joint and several individual liability on officers and directors of unincorporated association organized pursuant to ORS chapter 260 as a political committee. Leslie v. Bendl, 92 Or App 519, 759 P2d 301 (1988), Sup Ct review denied


      False statement is material if statement could or would significantly influence reader’s decision-making process. Bryant v. Recall for Lowell’s Future Committee, 286 Or App 691, 400 P3d 980 (2017)


ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Court authority to determine that candidate for legislature shall be deprived of election, (1979) Vol 39, p 567




      See annotations under ORS 260.118.




      See annotations under ORS 260.695.




      See also annotations under ORS 260.412 in permanent edition.


ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Prohibitions against inducing a “diversionary” candidacy, (1976) Vol 37, p 1026






In general


      Prohibition against wearing of political buttons, badges or insignia within polling place is unconstitutional infringement of elector’s right to free speech. Picray v. Secretary of State, 140 Or App 592, 916 P2d 324 (1996), aff’d 325 Or 279, 936 P2d 974 (1997)




Under former similar statute (ORS 260.650)


      Application of prohibition against electioneering to circulation of initiative petitions, (1972) Vol 35, p 1233; poll book or public record relating to election as subject to public inspection, (1977) Vol 38, p 1318






      When defendant chose to file candidate’s statement for Voter’s Pamphlet pursuant to ORS 251.085, its substance was circumscribed by law and statements regarding his educational background were “required under the election laws” within the meaning of this section. State v. Huntley, 82 Or App 350, 728 P2d 868 (1986), Sup Ct review denied


      When statement is certified as true, statutory prohibition against making false statement is contemporary variant of perjury and is not unconstitutional under Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution. State v. Huntley, 82 Or App 350, 728 P2d 868 (1986), Sup Ct review denied


      It is not grant of unequal privileges or immunities under Article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution that prosecutor may choose between charging unsworn falsification (ORS 162.085) and making false statements under this section. State v. Huntley, 82 Or App 350, 728 P2d 868 (1986), Sup Ct review denied


      Where defendant posted on online forum advertisement stating defendant would give another person $20 if person brought ballot to defendant and allowed defendant to complete ballot, then person would sign ballot and defendant would submit ballot, defendant’s post was “offer to purchase” as that phrase is used in subsection (9) of this section even though defendant meant post as joke and did not intend to follow through with offer. State v. Hirschman, 279 Or App 338, 379 P3d 616 (2016)