Chapter 647

 

      647.005

 

NOTES OF DECISIONS

 

      Meaning of term “trade name,” as used in Code of Professional Responsibility of Oregon State Bar, is not same as meaning of that term under this section. In re Shannon/Johnson, 292 Or 339, 638 P2d 482 (1982)

 

      647.035

 

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 62 OLR 158 (1983)

 

      647.095

 

NOTES OF DECISIONS

 

      Where ordinary purchaser was not likely to confuse antifreeze of plaintiff and defendants, all of same yellow color and packaged in F-style jug, there was no likelihood of injury to plaintiff’s business reputation and no ground for injunctive relief. Union Carbide Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 619 F Supp 1028 (1985)

 

      647.107

 

NOTES OF DECISIONS

 

      In order for trade name or trademark to be diluted so as to require granting of injunctive relief under this section, trademark or trade name must be distinctive. Airwick Ind. v. Alpkem Corp., 384 F Supp 1027 (1974)

 

      Where defendant used word “Wedgwood” in retirement apartment business located partially in marketing area of plaintiffs’ residential real estate development and marketing business, and trial court found word “Wedgwood” to be synonymous with plaintiffs’ activities in real estate, plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief under this section. Wedgwood Homes v. Lund, 58 Or App 240, 648 P2d 393 (1982), aff’d 294 Or 493, 659 P2d 377 (1983)

 

      “Dilution” may refer to injury to value of mark caused by actual or potential customer confusion, or to injury caused by use which detracts from the reputation associated with the mark or to any diminution in uniqueness and individuality of the mark caused by another’s use of similar mark. Wedgwood Homes v. Lund, 294 Or 493, 659 P2d 377 (1983)

 

      Where ordinary purchaser was not likely to confuse antifreeze of plaintiff and defendants, all of same yellow color and packaged in F-style jug, there was no likelihood of injury to plaintiff’s business reputation and no ground for injunctive relief. Union Carbide Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 619 F Supp 1028 (1985)

 

      Where trade name is not inherently distinctive, plaintiff must prove that name has acquired secondary meaning to extent that identification with plaintiff is primary significance in minds of consumers. Ernst Hardware Co. v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 134 Or App 560, 895 P2d 1363 (1995), Sup Ct review denied

 

LAW REVIEW CITATIONS: 14 WLJ 245 (1978); 62 OLR 157 (1983)