Chapter 809
809.210
NOTE: Repealed as of October 1, 2020
ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS
Under former similar statute
Limited driving order not to supersede a suspension, (1976) Vol 38, p 172
809.235
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Under former similar statute (ORS 809.410)
License revocation is remedial measure not constituting punishment for underlying offense. Mannelin v. DMV, 176 Or App 9, 31 P3d 438 (2001), aff’d 336 Or 147, 82 P3d 162 (2003)
In general
License revocation is remedial measure not constituting punishment for underlying offense. State v. Vazquez-Escobar, 211 Or App 115, 153 P3d 168 (2007), Sup Ct review denied
Permanent revocation of driving privileges of person convicted of felony while driving under influence of intoxicants or of multiple driving under influence of intoxicants offenses applies to person convicted of felony or offenses while operating bicycle under influence of intoxicants. State v. Abbey, 239 Or App 306, 245 P3d 152 (2010), Sup Ct review denied
Driving under influence of intoxicants conviction under law in effect prior to 1986 adoption of current vehicle code counts as predicate offense for purposes of permanently revoking person’s driving privileges. State v. Kellar, 349 Or 626, 247 P3d 1232 (2011)
Conviction for driving under influence of intoxicants under [former] ORS 487.540 is predicate offense for permanent revocation of person’s driving privileges under this provision. State v. Danby, 256 Or App 599, 301 P3d 958 (2013), Sup Ct review denied
Sixth Amendment is not violated by use of defendant’s uncounseled prior conviction for DUII as predicate for permanent revocation of driving privileges, because revocation is civil disability and is not enhancement of punishment. State v. Hamann, 363 Or 264, 422 P3d 193 (2018)
Out-of-state conviction cannot serve as predicate offense under this section unless offense requires proof that impairment of person, or of person’s driving, is causally related to person’s use of intoxicants; thus, trial court erred in permanently revoking defendant’s driving privileges when court relied on out-of-state conviction for first-degree negligent driving, which did not require such proof. State v. Ramirez, 312 Or App 117, 493 P3d 522 (2021)
809.250
See annotations under ORS 809.275.
809.260
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Under former similar statute
Phrase “17 years of age or younger” is unambiguous, and applies to defendant, who has passed his 17th birthday but not yet reached his 18th. State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. White, 83 Or App 225, 730 P2d 1279 (1986), Sup Ct review denied
Provisions of this section that persons over age of 13 and under 17 years old who are convicted of being minor in possession of alcohol shall have driving privileges denied does not violate Oregon Constitution, Article I, section 20 or Article I, section 16. State v. Day, 84 Or App 291, 733 P2d 937 (1987), Sup Ct review denied
809.270
ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS
Under former similar statute
Limited driving order not to supersede a suspension, (1976) Vol 38, p 172
809.275
(formerly 809.250)
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Absence in judgment of condition of probation that is required by statute and is included in court order sent to Department of Motor Vehicles is considered clerical error in judgment and judgment must be corrected on remand by trial court, but statute does not conflict with Interstate License Compact, ORS 802.540, and Oregon court may confiscate out-of-state driver license although court has no authority to suspend driving privileges in another state. State v. Scott, 96 Or App 451, 773 P2d 394 (1989)
809.310
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Under former similar statute
Where petitioner misused another’s driver license, Motor Vehicles Division had no authority to cancel her license under this section because “permitting misuse” does not include misusing another’s license. Wester v. MVD, 82 Or App 641, 728 P2d 953 (1986)
In general
Alleged violations of Article I, section 9 of Oregon Constitution or Fourth Amendment of U.S. Constitution are outside scope of hearing regarding cancellation of driving privileges under this section. Merrifield v. MVD, 106 Or App 359, 807 P2d 329 (1991)
809.380
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Under former similar statute (ORS 486.211)
Where operator license was suspended and suspension was later held invalid, operator remained responsible for failure to comply with suspension terms while suspension was in effect. State v. Day, 40 Or App 235, 594 P2d 1285 (1979), Sup Ct review denied
ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS
Under former similar statute (ORS 486.211)
Distinctions between license suspension and revocation, (1976) Vol 38, p 257
809.390
ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS
Under former similar statute (ORS 486.211)
Distinctions between license suspension and revocation, (1976) Vol 38, p 257
809.409
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Under former similar statute (ORS 809.410)
Where court uses statutory authority to reduce conviction for felony vehicular offense to misdemeanor judgment, conviction is not “felony conviction” for purposes of revocation. State v. Rodarte, 178 Or App 173, 35 P3d 1116 (2001)
809.411
ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS
Under former similar statute (ORS 486.211)
Mandatory suspension unaffected by issuance of a limited driving order, (1976) Vol 38, p 172
809.419
LAW REVIEW CITATIONS
Under former similar statute (ORS 809.410)
29 WLR 829 (1993)
809.420
See annotations under ORS 809.428.
809.428
(formerly 809.420)
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Where defendant had no prior conviction when citation for driving under influence of intoxicants was issued, court erred in imposing three-year suspension of his driver license. State v. Oeleis, 100 Or App 590, 786 P2d 1322 (1990)
809.430
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Under former similar statute
Where defendant had not taken delivery of any written notices of suspension of license sent to him, evidence of defendant’s prior driving convictions was admissible for purpose of proving defendant’s knowledge that his license was suspended. State v. Hetland, 31 Or App 529, 570 P2d 1201 (1977), Sup Ct review denied
Evidence that Division followed required procedure for notifying defendant of suspension was sufficient to support finding that defendant had received notice. State v. Gartzke, 35 Or App 151, 580 P2d 1062 (1978)
Notification that certified mail is at post office is notice of suspension. State v. DeMello, 300 Or 590, 716 P2d 732 (1986)
ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS
Under former similar statute
Receipt of notice not relevant to sufficiency of service, (1976) Vol 38, p 164
809.440
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Petitioner seeking administrative review is entitled to raise defenses not listed in this section because list of defenses is not exclusive. Richardson v. DMV, 253 Or App 456, 292 P3d 557 (2012)
ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS: Lack of Department of Transportation discretion regarding imposition of mandatory suspension or mandatory suspension lengths, (2007) No. 8284
809.450
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Motor Vehicles Division erred in not rescinding petitioner’s suspension under this section because MVD’s finding that petitioner did not reasonably nor in good faith believe that he was in compliance with financial responsibility requirements was not supported by substantial evidence. Applebee v. MVD, 98 Or App 299, 778 P2d 995 (1989)
Absent receipt of contrary information, receipt of insurance identification card showing coverage period was grounds for good faith belief that use was covered. Grasle v. MVD, 127 Or App 618, 873 P2d 1114 (1994)
809.600 to 809.660
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Under former similar statute
Dismissal of previous complaint alleging defendant was habitual traffic offender barred second complaint alleging same cause of action where court has signed order which adjudged defendant was not habitual traffic offender. State ex rel MVD v. Henigan, 37 Or App 135, 586 P2d 395 (1978)
Neither Article I, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution or the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution require appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in habitual traffic offender proceedings. State v. Rhoades, 54 Or App 254, 634 P2d 806 (1981), Sup Ct review denied
There is no limitation period for proceedings under the Habitual Traffic Offenders Act. State v. Renteria, 59 Or App 619, 651 P2d 1362 (1982)
ATTY. GEN. OPINIONS
Under former similar statute
Convictions prior to 1973 Habitual Traffic Offenders Act, (1974) Vol 36, p 859
809.600
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Under former similar statute
The defendant was an habitual offender under the Habitual Traffic Offenders Act where the municipal court forfeited the defendant’s bail on a reckless driving charge and such forfeiture was for a third specified statutory offense within a five-year period. State v. Gaskey, 24 Or App 1, 544 P2d 182 (1976)
The three-convictions requirement of this section is not satisfied by multiple convictions arising from less than three accidents. State v. Zook, 27 Or App 543, 556 P2d 989 (1976)
Violation of 55 miles per hour maximum speed limit may be considered in determining whether individual is habitual traffic offender. State v. Stehle, 33 Or App 115, 575 P2d 994 (1978)
Reference in this section to prior convictions for driving under influence of intoxicants or with .10 percent or more blood alcohol content includes convictions under former similar statutes. State v. Branstetter, 42 Or App 109, 600 P2d 431 (1979), Sup Ct review denied
Where defendant had been convicted of driving under influence of alcohol in California, driving under influence of intoxicants in Oregon, and reckless driving in California, but where, after he was charged with being habitual traffic offender, his California conviction of reckless driving was amended to conviction of failure to drive on right side of roadway, defendant had not been convicted of three traffic offenses required to make him habitual traffic offender within meaning of this section. State v. Carter, 45 Or App 301, 608 P2d 570 (1980)
In general
Defendant could collaterally attack two felony driving while suspended convictions in proceedings seeking habitual traffic offender (HTO) order. State v. Hardt, 81 Or App 607, 726 P2d 953 (1986), on reconsideration 83 Or App 221, 730 P2d 1278 (1986), Sup Ct review denied
809.640
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Where Motor Vehicles Division revoked defendant’s driving privileges under habitual offender statute, notice of revocation failed to convey to defendant information required by statute, namely, date that revocation would take effect unless defendant acted to request hearing and, thus, conviction was based on inadequate notice of revocation. State v. Atkinson, 305 Or 295, 751 P2d 784 (1988)
This section limits agency to determining only whether there was error in compiling conviction shown in driving record supporting revocation order and does not allow consideration of validity of underlying DUII conviction. Moore v. MVD, 109 Or App 195, 818 P2d 974 (1991), Sup Ct review denied
809.650
NOTE: Repealed as of January 1, 2019
NOTES OF DECISIONS
License revocation of habitual offender continues in effect after specified minimum time until driver applies for and receives restoration. State v. Stanfill, 166 Or App 104, 997 P2d 297 (2000)
809.660
NOTE: Repealed as of January 1, 2019
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Under former similar statute
License revocation of habitual offender continues in effect after specified minimum time until driver applies for and receives restoration. State v. Daniels, 320 Or App 466, 886 P2d 1019 (1994)
In general
License revocation of habitual offender continues in effect after specified minimum time until driver applies for and receives restoration. State v. Stanfill, 166 Or App 104, 997 P2d 297 (2000)
809.720
NOTES OF DECISIONS
This section does not confer to impounding authority exclusive possession of impounded vehicle. State v. Dimmick, 248 Or App 167, 273 P3d 212 (2012)
This section does not confer to police possessory interest in contents of vehicle that is greater than possessory rights of owner of those contents. State v. Dimmick, 248 Or App 167, 273 P3d 212 (2012)